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Kolin 1757: Frederick the Great's First Defeat (Campaign)
Simon Millar Manufacturer: Osprey Publishing ProductGroup: Book Binding: Paperback  Austria
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ASIN: 1841762970 Release Date: 2001-10-25 |
Book Description
In May of 1757 Frederick the Great invaded Bohemia, smashed an Austrian army outside Prague and bottled it up in the city. The Empress Maria Theresa despatched Marshal Daun with 60,000 men to save the Empire's second city. Frederick had won a string of victories over the Austrians and was convinced his men would always triumph. Although outnumbered he attacked, but the Austrians were waiting. His army was defeated and forced to withdraw. As his veterans commented, 'they were not the same old Austrians at all'. Simon Millar shows how Frederick's overconfidence proved his undoing at Kolin.Customer Reviews:
Good Narrative with Analysis.......2001-12-01
The book begins with a short section on the road to war and chronology of the campaign, then moves rapidly into sections on opposing commanders, opposing armies and a detailed order of battle. The section on commanders is quite good, and also discusses command and control in 18th Century warfare. The Spring 1757 Campaign and Battle of Prague in May 1757 are covered in eight pages. Unfortunately, the lack of a map for the Battle of Prague is a serious omission, since Frederick attempted similar maneuvers that should be compared at both Prague and Kolin. Frederick's invasion of Bohemia in the Spring of 1757 also demonstrated his tendency to disperse his army in unsupporting columns, lacking centralized coordination and a weighted main effort. The Spring Campaign also demonstrated the Austrian preference for unimaginative cordon defense tactics. While Frederick won the Battle of Prague, it was a costly victory due to the lack of effective Prussian terrain reconnaissance.
The Battle of Kolin itself, which resulted from an Austrian counteroffensive to relieve the besieged city of Prague, is well covered in forty pages of text. There are three 3-D "Bird's Eye View" maps which depict the battle in phases covering 1600-1730 hours, 1730-1830 hours and 1900-2100 hours. Also included are five 2-D maps which depict the approach march to battle, the initial dispositions and the retreat into Saxony. Three excellent battle scenes depict Field Marshal Daun atop Przerovsky Hill, the repulse of the Prussian Norman dragoons by IR Botta and Frederick leaving the field. Overall, the battle narrative is clear and well-supported by maps and illustrations, although the tangled nature of the charges and counter-charges atop Krzeczor Hill are difficult to follow. One minor criticism is that the author's reference to the "smell of cordite" over the battlefield is erroneous since cordite was not yet invented.
A welcome but unusual section in the aftermath of the battle attempts to analyze the action using the principles of war. Unfortunately, the author does not seem to fully grasp what the principle of war consist of, since he includes morale and flexibility - which are not principles - but excludes maneuver and unity of command. The author properly points out that the principle of objective was compromised by poor Prussian reconnaissance. The principles of surprise and security were also squandered, which contributed greatly to defeat. While the author properly pounds Frederick for lacking mass and wasting resources on secondary objectives, the criticisms only partly explain that the Prussians were attempting to attack at roughly 1:2 odds, instead of the recommended 3:1. Overall, Frederick attempted to use maneuver and the offensive by means of a turning movement to place his enemies in a position of peril, which in itself was a good idea. However, Frederick's turning movement was very clumsy and like his later famous "oblique order," represented little more than a cleverly executed frontal attack. Tactically, Frederick relied on the brawn of his infantry and cavalry to bash their way through a weak point in the enemy cordon, but Frederick was not very adept at finding those weak points. Poor reconnaissance and the lack of effective combined arms tactics that made integrated use of artillery, cavalry and infantry were the weak points of Frederick's method of warfare.
While the author addresses Frederick throughout the text, the portrait that emerges of Frederick in this campaign is far from "great." In particular, Frederick's contempt for the enemy severely degraded the quality of his operational planning; the author notes, "Frederick anticipated the Austrians accommodating his plan by doing nothing to interfere with the movement of his army." Frederick also had an unfortunate tendency to leave his army when things were going badly, which he did at Mollwitz, Lobositz and Kolin. Instead of rallying his defeated troops, Frederick hastened to the rear to sulk. Contrast Frederick's departure with Robert E. Lee's meeting the returning survivors of Pickett's Charge at Gettysburg in 1863 and the disparity of styles in defeat are striking. When the Austrians pursued the defeated Prussians, Frederick turned over command to his brother while Frederick took to bed to mourn the death of his mother (apparently the death of thousands of his troops bothered him less). Yet when Frederick's brother was bested by the Austrians in a minor action, Frederick humiliatingly removed him from command. If anything is taught by the campaign of Kolin, it is that "greatness" is battlefield command is determined by exemplary leadership qualities, not the execution of fancy tactical maneuvers.
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